Onwards and Upwards!

3 June 2007 was a milestone for carbon pricing in Australia: this was the date when putting a price on carbon finally became a bipartisan policy objective. Environmental types may harp about how Australian coal generators and energy companies "should have seen this coming for decades" but the fact is that as recently as four years ago the notion that a national carbon price (through a cap and trade scheme or a tax) was somehow 'inevitable' was by no means a foregone conclusion.

This point is by no means irrelevant to the current debate.

No material infrastructure investment decision in Australia will get past an Investment Committee process without a detailed financial model based on the well-founded principle of discounting cash flows (DCF). This is equally the case for investments by corporates, super funds and private equity (perhaps with the occasional exception in the more risk-loving mining states). For those not familiar with the logic behind DCF, here's a quick run-down:

- The only reason you invest money is because you expect to get money back at some time in the future. It is assumed that by making a series of well-reasoned assumptions about future performance, you can make a reasonably reliable estimate of how much money you will receive in each future time period.

- Not only do you expect to get your money back, you expect to get a bit more to compensate you for risking it in the first place. The more risk, the more you expect to get back. The return is usually expressed as a percentage return on your investment and by working back from the future date to the present and reducing each of your expected future cash flows each year, you can figure out how much you should be willing to spend on something now to receive the forecast payment in each future year.

- Adding up all of these "present value" numbers gives you a target price - if you can undertake the investment for less than this, you should do so, otherwise you shouldn't.

The DCF method of valuation is ubiquitous. The problem is that it's only as effective as the values that you plug into it and it implicitly relies on being able to make a relatively reliable forecast of future earnings.

When guys like Marius Kloppers (CEO of BHP) come out in support of a carbon trading scheme on the basis of "reducing uncertainty for business" they are not talking about a vague, qualitative type of uncertainty. Not knowing whether a project is going to have a substantial new cost tacked onto it means not being able to predict future cash flows and not knowing what annual percentage return you should expect to earn.

Companies can respond to this in several ways:

- Use a 'worst case scenario': in this case, many good projects that should be undertaken, won't be.

- Delay: given that the uncertainty will be removed once the political decision is made, many companies may simply delay the investment decision in the hope the policy is resolved quickly.

- Consider a range of policy outcomes and come up with a probability weighted outcome: this will reduce the level of underinvestment by consider both the best-case and worst-case scenarios. However, while there is an option to delay, delaying would generally be more favourable.

There has been no substantial new electricity generation infrastructure built for a very long time now. The impact of delaying and under investing in projects is that supply is constrained, which forces up the prices paid to existing electricity generators and eventually this rise in prices must be passed on to consumers.

So, at this stage, it appears we're faced with a bit of a Morton's fork:

1. Bring in a carbon price and energy prices will go up because of the added cost of carbon.
2. Don't bring in a carbon price and energy prices will go up because of a supply shortage.

It could be argued that there's the option to take a firm policy stance against any sort of carbon pricing but I would suggest that since 3 January 2007 this suggestion would be less than credible.

For those who took issue with coal generators receiving substantial compensation under the Rudd Government CPRS proposal, consider this: under the CPRS the proportion of compensation to generators was a minor portion of the total expected cost of a CPRS (perhaps around 25-30% for the first five years) and came from a much larger pool of revenues being delivered to Government. That Government revenue could be redistributed through welfare payments to those most dramatically impacted. While carbon pricing is being delayed, higher prices from underinvestment means that existing coal generators will be getting a bonanza - and they won't be sharing any of it.